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RECOVERING RETIREMENT SECURITY: AN ANALYSIS OF 
THE LOCKDOWN CLAIMS UNDER ERISA, AS 
ILLUSTRATED BY THE ENRON LITIGATION 
MARGO EBERLEIN∗  
INTRODUCTION 
On December 2, 2001, Enron Corporation (“Enron”) filed for 
bankruptcy after “the biggest, fastest corporate collapse in American 
history.”1 Prior to the bankruptcy, many of Enron’s employees al-
ready had lost considerable amounts of money as participants in the 
Enron 401(k) Savings Plan (the “401(k) Plan”) during the decline in 
the value of both the 401(k) Plan and in their personal accounts spe-
cifically, which were heavily invested in Enron stock.2 Because of a 
period of time when changes in the investment allocation of the 
401(k) Plan were prohibited, the participants were unable to move 
their retirement investments out of Enron stock while its value rap-
idly declined.3 
A class action was filed in the Southern District of Texas under 
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”)4 on be-
half of the Enron employees who were participants in or beneficiaries 
of the 401(k) Plan (the “Plaintiffs”).5 Filed on April 8, 2002, Tittle v. 
Enron, Corp.6 (the “Complaint”) includes allegations that the Enron 
Corporation; the Administrative Committee in charge of the 401(k) 
Plan;7 top executives, such as Kenneth Lay (“Lay”) and Jeffrey Skill-
 
 ∗  J.D., St. John’s University School of Law, 2004; Cornell University, School of Industrial 
and Labor Relations, 2001. 
 1. Kurt Eichenwald, Enron’s Many Strands: The Company Unravels; Enron Buffed Image 
to a Shine Even as It Rotted From Within, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2002, at A1. 
 2. See Michael A. Hiltzik & E. Scott Reckard, The Enron Inquiry: Enron Chairman Urged 
Employees to Buy Stock, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2002, at A1. 
 3. See id. This period of time is referred to as a lockdown; see also Part I, infra. 
 4. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq. (2000). 
 5. See Keller Rohrback L.L.P, The Case, at http://www.enronerisa.com/case.html (last 
visited Feb.1, 2004). 
 6. See generally First Am. and Consolidated Compl., Tittle v. Enron Corp., No. H-01-3913 
(S.D. Tex. Apr. 8, 2002), available at http://www.enronerisa.com/complaint.html. 
 7. Enron assigned the general administration of the 401(k) Plan to the Administrative 
Committee. The Committee was designated both the plan administrator and the named fiduci-
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ing (“Skilling”); and the Northern Trust Company (the 401(k) Plan’s 
previous plan administrator) breached fiduciary duties under ERISA 
by misrepresenting Enron’s financial status and encouraging employ-
ees to invest their retirement funds in Enron stock.8 The suit also al-
leges that the Defendants continued with their earlier decision to 
prohibit participants from changing the investment allocation of their 
401(k) plans (a “lockdown”), despite reconsideration and the 
decreasing value of Enron stock.9 This Note will focus on the second 
allegation; specifically, did the Administrative Committee breach a 
fiduciary duty under ERISA by deciding not to postpone the lock-
down of the Enron 401(k) Plan? 
Unfortunately, the Enron lockdown situation is not unique. Simi-
lar circumstances involving lockdowns have occurred recently in cor-
porations such as Lucent,10 International Paper,11 and Global 
Crossing.12 Because of the huge potential for loss, as demonstrated by 
Enron and other corporations, the issues that arise from lockdown 
periods must be explored, especially the possibility of relief for par-
ticipant employees who may lose much of their 401(k) retirement 
savings during a lockdown. Part I of this Note provides background 
information on 401(k) plans and lockdowns. Part II describes the 
situation surrounding Enron and its lockdown to illustrate implica-
 
ary. See ENRON CORP., ENRON CORP. SAVINGS PLAN, XIII.1 Administration of the Plan: 
Appointment of Committee, as amended and restated July 1, 1999. 
 8. See generally First Am. and Consolidated Compl., supra note 6. 
 9. See id. This Note will focus solely on the actions and liability of the Administrative 
Committee because it is the entity that made the decision not to postpone the lockdown. This 
Note will not discuss the potential liability of the Enron Corporation or top executives, who may 
possibly be liable for failing to monitor the Administrative Committee or as co-fiduciaries of the 
Administrative Committee. Moreover, this Note will not discuss Northern Trust Company’s 
potential liability. 
 10. See Dennis K. Berman, Accounting for Enron: All Tied Up: Retirement-Plan Lock-
downs at Lucent and Elsewhere Draw Questions, WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 2002, at C14. Lucent 
locked down its 401(k) plan on September 28, 2000, for fifteen days to allow its plan administra-
tor, Fidelity Investments, to “balance the assets” of the plan when Lucent spun off its business 
communications division Avaya Inc. During the lockdown the value of the shares dropped 19% 
from $27.01 to $21.81. See id. 
 11. See Ellen E. Schultz, ‘Lockdowns’ of 401(k) Plans Draw Scrutiny: Enron Employees’ 
Losses Suddenly Put Practice in Spotlight, WALL ST. J., Jan. 16, 2002, at C1. International Paper, 
Inc. locked down its 401(k) plan on November 30, 1999, until January 31, 2000. Forty-three 
percent of the plan’s assets were invested in company stock. During the lockdown the value of 
the company’s stock fell 9% to $47.63. See id. 
 12. See Dennis K. Berman, Global Crossing Curbed Sales of Staffers’ Shares, WALL ST. J., 
Jan. 31, 2002, at A3. Global Crossing locked down its 401(k) plan from December 14, 2001 to 
January 18, 2002 while it switched plan administrators from Putnam Investments to Fidelity 
Investments. During the lockdown the value of the company stock dropped 19% from sixty-
seven cents to fifty-four cents. See id. 
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tions of the current state of 401(k) regulation. Part III discusses the 
duties imposed by ERISA, the statute that governs 401(k) plans, as 
well as the attempts to increase protections for employee participants 
through changes in the law implemented after the collapse of Enron. 
Part IV outlines the lockdown claim presented in the Tittle com-
plaint, and finally, Part IV predicts the potential for participant suc-
cess in lockdown litigation generally, as well as for the Plaintiffs in the 
Tittle litigation specifically. 
I. 401(K) PLANS AND LOCKDOWNS 
In a qualified retirement plan such as a 401(k) plan, both the 
employee and the employer (on behalf of the employee) make con-
tributions to the participant’s individual 401(k) account.13 These plans 
offer participants a range of alternative investments to which they 
may allocate their funds. The funds are held in a trust and accumulate 
for the benefit of the participants,14 enabling the employee to save for 
his or her eventual retirement.15 401(k) plans also offer favorable tax 
consequences to both employers and employees. When an employer 
makes a contribution to the plan, it receives a deduction for the 
amount contributed, and the employee does not record any income 
until the funds are ultimately distributed.16 
The popularity of 401(k) plans has increased in recent years be-
cause the plans provide an opportunity for the employer to offer 
valuable retirement benefits to employees at a low cost to the em-
ployer.17 Additionally, the portability of 401(k) plans further increases 
their popularity; when employees switch employers they may carry 
their 401(k) plan to the new workplace.18 In 2000, 401(k) plans had 
 
 13. See 1 MICHAEL J. CANAN, QUALIFIED RETIREMENT AND OTHER EMPLOYEE BENEFIT 
PLANS § 3.1 (Practitioner ed. 1997). 
 14. See id. 
 15. See id. Normally these funds are distributed to the participant upon retirement. How-
ever, the funds may also be distributed to employee participants upon termination of service 
with the employer. Additionally, the funds may be distributed as a lump sum payment or in 
installations over the participants’ lifetimes depending upon the provisions in a particular plan. 
See id. 
 16. See id. at § 3.1(A). 
 17. See Donald C. Dahlgren & Paul J. Dauenhauer, Business Clients: Pensions, in 2 LEGAL 
COMPLIANCE CHECKUPS: BUSINESS CLIENTS § 16:19 (Robert B. Hughes ed., 2001). Employers 
have low costs because employees in 401(k) plans fund the plan contributions with reductions in 
salary, while employees receive the benefit of pre-tax retirement savings. See id. 
 18. See 401(k) Breeds Mobile Work force, AUGUSTA CHRON., Jan. 28, 2002 (stating that 
“[t]he portability of 401(k) . . . plans is one of the most favorable features,” and “workers can 
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nearly forty-two million participants19 and almost $2 trillion in assets.20 
About one-third of all pension plans are 401(k) plans, which cover 
approximately 45% of active participants.21 
Most public companies offer their own stock as an alternative for 
investment in their 401(k) plans. On average, 40% of the 401(k) plan 
assets in Fortune 50 corporations are invested in company stock.22 
Employers will often match employees’ contributions to their 40l(k) 
plans, and 49% of companies with an employer stock fund mandate 
that these matches be made with the company’s stock.23 Meanwhile, 
because the amount of plan assets that may be allocated to employer 
stock is not restricted in defined contribution plans such as 401(k) 
plans,24 there is often a high concentration of plan assets in company 
stock for this type of pension plan.25 
Generally participants of a 401(k) plan may freely change the al-
location of funds in their accounts.26 However, when a company 
changes plan administrators or when a structural change to a 401(k) 
plan occurs, such as a shift from daily to monthly valuation, a period 
of time is necessary where participants are prevented from moving 
their savings among funds in their 401(k) accounts.27 This period of 
 
move from one job to another without fear of losing their retirement nest eggs”), available at 
http://www.augustachronicle.com/stories/012802/bus_124-4597.shtml. 
 19. See INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, 401(K) PLAN PARTICIPANTS: 
CHARACTERISTICS, CONTRIBUTIONS, AND ACCOUNT ACTIVITY (Spring 2000). 
 20. See id.; see also News Release, Employee Benefits Research Inst., Retirement Data 
Available to Media (May 2, 2001), at http://www.ebri.org/prrel/pr562.htm. 
 21. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, HIGHLIGHTS FROM FORM 5500 REPORTS, available at 
http://www.dol.gov/. 
 22. See Bureau of Nat’l Affairs, Some 401(k) Assets in Company Stock at Higher Level than 
Enron, Report Says, 29 PENSION & BENEFITS REP. (BNA) No. 13, Mar. 26, 2002, at 965. A 
Democratic Policy Committee Report revealed that, of Fortune 50 corporations, “55% of the 
corporations’ plan assets were at least 30% invested in company stock; 38% of the corporations’ 
plan assets were at least 50% invested in company stock; 17% of the corporations’ plan assets 
were at least 70% invested in company stock; and 30% of the plan assets had a higher concen-
tration of company stock than Enron did in 2001.” See id. 
 23. See id. 
 24. See How Sound is Your Retirement Plan?: Lessons From Enron, FLA. EMP. L. LETTER, 
May 2002, at 2. In defined benefit plans, an alternative type of pension plan, ERISA requires 
that no more than 10% of plan assets be allocated to employer stock. See id. 
 25. This high concentration is not unique to Enron. Approximately 95% of Proctor & 
Gamble’s 401(k) is allocated to employer stock, while Coca-Cola’s plan is 81% invested in 
employer stock, and 74% of McDonald’s plan is allocated in employer stock. See id. 
 26. See Laura Bruce, The Push to Reform 401(k) Plans (Jan. 29, 2002), at 
http://www.bankrate.com/brm/news/sav/20020129a.asp?prodtype=grn. Defined contribution 
plans like 401(k) plans offer employees control over when to buy or sell most of their plan 
investments. See id. 
 27. See Schultz, supra note 11.  
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time is commonly referred to as a lockdown.28 Also called blackouts 
or quiet periods, these phases occur with great frequency and are 
both legal and routine.29 On any given day, ninety-six out of 350,000 
company plans that have 401(k) plans are locked down.30 Secretary of 
Labor Elaine Chao described lockdowns as follows: 
Blackout periods routinely occur when plans change service pro-
viders or when companies merge. Such periods are intended to en-
sure that account balance and participant information are 
transferred accurately. Blackout periods will vary in length depend-
ing on the condition of the records, the size of the plan, and number 
of investment options. While there are no specific ERISA rules 
governing blackout periods, plan fiduciaries are obliged to be pru-
dent in designing and implementing blackout periods affecting plan 
investments.31 
A total of 74% of 401(k) plans have had lockdown periods.32 
While the entire lockdown transition lasts an average of three or four 
weeks,33 the length of lockdown periods ranges from one day to two 
months.34 However, the actual transfer of assets between plan admin-
istrators takes between twenty-four and seventy-two hours in situa-
tions where a lockdown is imposed because of a change in plan 
administrators.35 
II. THE ENRON SCANDAL 
Of 21,000 Enron employees, 12,200 participated in the Corpora-
tion’s 401(k) Plan.36 Although various options existed for investment, 
 
 28. See Berman, supra note 10; see also Schultz, supra note 11. 
 29. See Schultz, supra note 11. 
 30. See Berman, supra note 10. 
 31. Maureen Minehan, Congress, Administration Scrutinize 401(k) Blackout Periods, 6 
COMPENSATION & BENEFITS UPDATE 5 (2002). 
 32. See Dallas L. Slaisbury et al., EMPLOYEE BENEFITS RESEARCH INST. ISSUE BRIEF NO. 
222, Retirement Confidence Survey 2000 (June 2000) [hereinafter EBRI BRIEF]. 
 33. See Press Release, Am. Soc’y of Pension Admin’rs, ASPA Releases Results on Lock-
down Survey: Lockdown Restrictions Hurt Small Business Retirement Plans (Feb. 8, 2002), 
available at www.aspa.org. The ASPA received survey responses from retirement plan adminis-
trators of 250 firms administering more than 85,000 retirement plans regarding lockdown ex-
periences; the firms were mostly small businesses. See id. 
 34. See EBRI BRIEF, supra note 32. 
 35. See Claire Mencke, 401(k) Sponsors: Go Slow on Reform, Stock Caps Are Resisted, 
INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY, Feb. 26, 2002, at A-11. 
 36. See Enron Ex-workers Forlornly View Rubble, N.H. SUN. NEWS, Dec. 16, 2001, avail-
able at http://www.enronerisa.com/news/news121601.html; see also Peter Behr & April Witt, 
Concerns Grow Amid Conflicts: Officials Seek to Limit Probe, Fallout of Details, WASH. POST, 
July 30, 2002, at A1. 
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most employees allocated much of their money to Enron stock.37 Ad-
ditionally, all of Enron’s matching contributions were made in the 
form of Enron stock, which could not be traded or sold until the em-
ployee reached age fifty.38 As a result, prior to the lockdown of the 
401(k) Plan, approximately $1.3 billion (more than two-thirds of the 
$2.1 billion fund) was invested in Enron stock.39 
From October 29, 2001 until November 12, 2001, Enron locked 
down the 401(k) Plan,40 preventing employees from changing the allo-
cation of their pension plan funds in that time period. During the 
lockdown, the stock price dropped 28% from $13.81 per share to 
$9.98 per share.41 By December 2, 2001, when Enron filed for bank-
ruptcy, the stock price was less than $1 per share,42 and the 401(k) 
plan had lost an estimated $1.3 billion.43 
The cause of the Corporation’s collapse centers around ques-
tionable accounting practices it utilized to report a series of its trans-
actions.44 Enron manipulated its quarterly and annual financial 
statements filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the 
“SEC”) in order to hide the true nature of the transactions.45 Mean-
while, starting in 2000, these manipulated transactions provided most 
of Enron’s profits.46 
The CEO and seventeen officers and directors of Enron signed 
financial statements that hid the transactions for the year 2000, “de-
claring [the financial statements] to be a true picture on which inves-
 
 37. See Enron Ex-workers Forlornly View Rubble, supra note 36. 
 38. ENRON CORP., ENRON CORP. SAVINGS PLAN, V.16(b) Investment of Accounts: In-
vestment of Company Contribution Accounts, as amended and restated July 1, 1999. 
 39. See Enron Ex-workers Forlornly View Rubble, supra note 36. A Democratic Policy 
Committee Report revealed that nearly one-third of Fortune 50 corporations’ 401(k) plans have 
higher concentrations of employer stock than Enron did last year. See Some 401(k) Assets in 
Company Stock at Higher Level than Enron, Report Says, supra note 22. 
 40. See Albert B. Crenshaw, Retirees, Workers Assail Enron on 401(k) Freeze; Witnesses 
Challenge Firm on Length of Halt in Stock Trading, WASH. POST, Dec. 19, 2001, at E12. These 
are the dates that Enron maintains the lockdown spanned. However, some dispute exists as to 
these dates. See infra text accompanying notes 63–65. 
 41. See April Witt & Peter Behr, Losses, Conflicts Threaten Survival: CFO Fastow Ousted 
In Probe of Profits, WASH. POST, July 31, 2002, at E12. These statistics track the dates that 
Enron maintains the lockdown occurred. 
 42. See Thomas A. Fogarty, Enron Officials Discussed Delaying 401(k) Revamp, USA 
TODAY, Feb. 5, 2002, at 3B. 
 43. See C. William Thomas, The Rise and Fall of Enron: When a Company Looks Too 
Good To Be True, it Usually Is, J. ACCOUNTANCY, Apr. 2002, at 41. 
 44. See id. 
 45. See id. 
 46. See id. 
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tors could rely.”47 However, Enron’s board members did not carefully 
monitor the partnerships that occurred during this year as well as 
prior years—a Senate subcommittee later concluded that they had 
repeatedly failed to ask pointed questions.48 
There is evidence that many at Enron were aware of the report-
ing omissions as well as the precarious financial condition of the Cor-
poration. For example, an in-house lawyer reviewed the questionable 
transactions in a legal risk memo and concluded that the transactions 
“might lead one to believe that the financial books at Enron are being 
manipulated.”49 At the behest of his superiors, he redrafted the memo 
to state that he did not know whether the transactions had been ma-
nipulated, but feared that this was the case.50 
But perhaps the most famous example that illustrates the Enron 
executives’ awareness of the Corporation’s financial condition is the 
anonymous letter written by Vice President Sherron Watkins to Ken-
neth Lay on August 15, 2001, the day following Chief Executive Offi-
cer Jeffrey Skilling’s resignation.51 Referring to the disclosure 
methods used in the transactions, Watkins stated that she was “in-
credibly nervous that [Enron] will implode in a wave of accounting 
scandals. Skilling’s abrupt departure will raise suspicions of account-
ing improprieties and valuation issues. Enron has been very aggres-
sive in its accounting.”52 This memo demonstrates that top Enron 
officials were aware of the Corporation’s gross overstatement of earn-
ings and the questionable deals prior to the lockdown of the 401(k) 
Plan.53 
Watkins requested a transfer because of her discomfort with 
these financial practices and was moved to Enron’s human resources 
department in August.54 Prior to her meeting with Kenneth Lay, she 
discussed the allegations in her memo with Cindy Olson, the Execu-
tive Vice President of Human Resources and Community Relations 
 
 47. Id. 
 48. See id. 
 49. April Witt & Peter Behr, Dream Job Turns Into a Nightmare: Skilling’s Success Came 
at High Price, WASH. POST, July 29, 2002, at A1. 
 50. See id. 
 51. See id. 
 52. Id.; see also Thomas, supra note 43, at 7. 
 53. Seven-page Memo Warned of Enron’s Collapse, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 17, 
2002, available at http://enronerisa.com/news/news011702.html. 
 54. See Retirement Insecurity: 401(k) Crisis at Enron: Hearings Before the Governmental 
Affairs Comm., 107 Cong. 241 (Feb. 5, 2002) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Cindy Olson, 
Executive Vice President of Human Resources and Community Relations, Enron). 
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and a member of the Administrative Committee.55 Olson then dis-
cussed Watson’s allegations with Mr. McMahon (the Chief Operating 
Officer), several other human resources vice presidents at Enron, and 
Cynthia Barrow (the Senior Director of Benefits), but maintains that 
she did not inform the rest of the Administrative Committee because 
she felt that the allegations were hearsay due to the anonymous na-
ture of the memo.56 
On October 16, 2001, Enron reported a quarterly loss of $1 bil-
lion, characterized the loss as “one-time,” and stated that the Corpo-
ration was “very confident in [its] strong earnings outlook.”57 On 
October 22, 2001, Enron announced the beginning of an SEC investi-
gation into its reporting techniques.58 
On October 29, 2001, Enron imposed the lockdown of its 401(k) 
Plan in order to change plan administrators from the Northern Trust 
Company to Hewitt Associates.59 The Corporation began the search 
for a new benefits administrator in January 2001, and Enron selected 
Hewitt in May 2001.60 About three weeks prior to the lockdown, En-
ron mailed a brochure to all participants that explained the transition 
period and outlined its timeframe.61 Additionally, all Enron employ-
ees with e-mail accounts received further reminders in the days pre-
ceding the lockdown.62 Although disagreement exists regarding the 
exact days the lockdown began and ended, Enron maintains that the 
lockdown began on the morning of October 29, 2001, and that No-
vember 12, 2001 was the last day participants could not make changes 
to their accounts.63 During this period Enron’s stock price dropped 
from $13.81 to $9.98, or 28%.64 However, a panel of Enron workers 
and retirees testified in front of the Senate Commerce Committee 
that the freeze began on October 17, and several retirees stated they 
were unable to sell for one month or more.65 
 
 55. See id. at 231, 239 (statement of Cindy Olson). 
 56. See id. at 241–42, 258–59 (statement of Cindy Olson). 
 57. Witt & Behr, supra note 41, at A1; see also Thomas, supra note 43, at 7. 
 58. See Witt & Behr, supra note 41. 
 59. See Minehan, supra note 31. 
 60. See Hearings, supra note 54, at 232 (statement of Mikie Rath, Benefits Manager, En-
ron). 
 61. See id. at 232. 
 62. See id. 
 63. See Crenshaw, supra note 40. 
 64. See Witt & Behr, supra note 41. 
 65. See Crenshaw, supra note 40. The employees testified before the Senate Committee on 
December 18, 2001. 
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Mikie Rath, benefits manager and a member of the Administra-
tive Committee, stated that the Administrative Committee consid-
ered postponing the lockdown, but did not because it was not feasible 
to notify the 20,000 participants in a timely fashion.66 Also, Rath said 
that “[a]s the Enron news continued to break . . . the [A]dministrative 
[C]ommittee again considered stopping the transaction.”67 Cindy Ol-
son stated that on the advice of counsel and despite concerns to the 
contrary, that the Committee made the decision to go ahead with the 
lockdown as planned.68 
In fact, on October 25, 2001, Enron contacted both Hewitt and 
Northern Trust to consider delaying the lockdown or halting it alto-
gether.69 However, later that day both companies were informed that 
no schedule changes regarding the lockdown would occur.70 
In a November 8, 2001 report to shareholders and the SEC (is-
sued during the lockdown period), Enron admitted to violating ac-
counting rules in its accounting methods.71 The Corporation restated 
its financial statements from 1997 to 2001 to reflect transactions that 
had been omitted, showing a loss of approximately $600 million over 
four years.72 By November 30, 2001, Enron’s stock price was valued at 
twenty-six cents per share.73 Ultimately, Enron filed for bankruptcy 
on December 2, 2001.74 In total, the 401(k) Plan had lost an estimated 
$1.3 billion during the decline of Enron stock from more than $80 in 
January 2001 to less than $1 when the firm filed for bankruptcy in 
December 2001.75 
III. FIDUCIARY DUTIES IMPOSED BY ERISA 
ERISA has no statutory language relating specifically to lock-
downs.76 Therefore, in analyzing lockdown claims generally, and the 
 
 66. See Hearings, supra note 54, at 232, 246 (statement of Mikie Rath). 
 67. See id. 
 68. See id. at 250–51 (statement of Cindy Olson). 
 69. See id. at 236 (statement of Catheryn Graham, Hewitt Associates); see also id. at 234 
(statement of Joseph Szathmary, Associate, Northern Trust Retirement Consulting). 
 70. See id. at 236 (statement of Catheryn Graham); see also id. at 234 (statement of Joseph 
Szathmary). 
 71. See Peter Behr & April Witt, Hidden Debts, Deals Scuttle Last Chance, WASH. POST, 
Aug. 1, 2002, at A1. 
 72. See Thomas, supra note 43. 
 73. See id. 
 74. See id. 
 75. See Fogarty, supra note 42. 
 76. See generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq.; Minehan, supra note 31. 
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claims alleged in the Tittle complaint specifically, an application of 
the general fiduciary standards of ERISA is necessary. The fiduciary 
duties of ERISA pertinent to these issues include the duties of pru-
dence and loyalty.77 
In enacting ERISA, Congress declared that “it is desirable in the 
interests of employees and their beneficiaries . . . that disclosure be 
made and safeguards be provided with respect to the establishment, 
operation, and administration” of pension plans, such as 401(k) 
plans.78 Therefore, Congress required “the disclosure and reporting to 
participants . . . in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries . . . 
of financial and other information with respect thereto,” and pro-
tected participants’ interests “by establishing standards of conduct, 
responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit 
plans, and by providing appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready 
access to the Federal courts.”79 
Under ERISA, a person is a fiduciary of a plan when: 
(1) he exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary 
control respecting management of such plan or exercises any 
authority or control respecting management or disposition of 
its assets; 
(2) he renders investment advice for a fee or other compensa-
tion, direct or indirect, with respect to any moneys or other 
property of such plan, or has any authority or responsibility to 
do so; or 
(3) he has any discretionary authority or discretionary re-
sponsibility in the administration of such plan.80 
“This ‘functional’ definition of a fiduciary is extraordinarily 
broad,” and, therefore, the fiduciaries of a 401(k) plan may include 
trustees, all individuals with discretionary authority who are active in 
the plan’s administration, members of the plan’s investment commit-
tee, investment advisers, and those who select these individuals.81 Ad-
ditionally, anyone specifically designated to carry out fiduciary 
responsibilities under a 401(k) plan is included as a fiduciary.82 
 
 77. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (2000). 
 78. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2000). 
 79. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2000). 
 80. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (2000). 
 81. See Joseph R. Simone & Glenn E. Butash, Understanding Erisa 2001: An Introduction 
to Basic Employee Retirement Benefits, Fiduciary Responsibility and Prohibited Transactions 
Under ERISA, PLI ORDER NO. J0-0042, *682–83 (2001). 
 82. 29 U.S.C. § 1105(c)(1)(B) (2000). 
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“ERISA generally adopts, codifies[,] and expands the common 
law of trusts in defining the duties of a fiduciary.”83 Under ERISA, 
fiduciaries owe participants the duties of prudence and loyalty.84 
ERISA also imposes other fiduciary duties that are irrelevant to the 
lockdown claims considered in this Note.85 
The duty of prudence requires that fiduciaries act “with the care, 
skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing 
that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such 
matters would use in the conduct of” a similar enterprise.86 Addition-
ally, the duty of loyalty requires that fiduciaries discharge their duties 
solely in the interests of participants, for the exclusive purpose of 
providing benefits to participants.87 
Some basic fiduciary responsibilities related to lockdowns can be 
inferred from the duties of prudence and loyalty. First, it is both pru-
dent and loyal for a fiduciary to give advance notice of a lockdown 
period to plan participants. Additionally, a fiduciary should avoid 
implementing a lockdown when fluctuations in the value plan alterna-
tives are likely because participants will not be able to change the 
allocation of their investment in response to the fluctuations. Thus, 
fiduciaries may violate the duties of prudence and loyalty by failing to 
adequately notify participants of a lockdown, and by poorly schedul-
ing a lockdown period. 
Under ERISA, a fiduciary who breaches the duties imposed by 
the statute may be personally liable for any loss incurred as a result of 
the breach.88 The remedies include equitable and remedial relief such 
 
 83. See Simone & Butash, supra note 81, at *684. 
 84. See id. 
 85. Fiduciaries also have a duty to act in accordance with plan documents. See id. Fiduciar-
ies also have a duty to diversify the investments in the plan to minimize the risk of large losses. 
See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C) (2000). A fiduciary that delegates any responsibilities to another 
fiduciary must not only monitor the other’s conduct, but also must terminate the delegation of 
responsibility if necessary. See Simone & Butash, supra note 81, at *685. Finally, a fiduciary may 
be liable for a breach of duty by another fiduciary if he participates knowingly in, or undertakes 
to conceal an act or omission of the other fiduciary, if by failure to carry out his responsibilities 
under ERISA he enables another fiduciary to commit a breach, or if he has knowledge of a 
breach by such other fiduciary, unless he makes reasonable efforts under the circumstances to 
remedy the breach. See 29 U.S.C. § 1105(a) (2000). 
 86. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (2000). 
 87. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A)(i) (2000); see also Simone & Butash, supra note 81, at 
*685. 
 88. See Simone & Butash, supra note 81, at *697. 
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as injunctions, removal, attorney’s fees, and interest.89 Punitive dam-
ages are generally not recoverable under the statute.90 
Some recent legislative changes enacted after Enron’s collapse 
affect the current regulation of 401(k) plans. Although Congress has 
failed to pass legislation specific to 401(k) plans,91 on July 30, 2002, 
President Bush signed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act into law.92 This corpo-
rate accountability law granted the Department of Labor the power 
to create regulations requiring thirty days of advance notice to par-
ticipants before a lockdown begins.93 The thirty-day notice is the only 
401(k) reform that Republicans and Democrats could agree upon.94 
While this legislation and the rules promulgated there represent pro-
gress for the protection of employee participants in 401(k) plans, this 
notice to participants of impending lockdowns mandated by the new 
regulations was already required by ERISA’s duties of prudence and 
loyalty.95 
 
 89. See id. 
 90. See id. 
 91. Leigh Strope, Workers to get 30-day Notice of 401(k) Lockout Periods, S. FLA. SUN-
SENTINEL, Oct. 21, 2002. 
 92. William Baue, The Strengths and Inadequacies of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Sept. 27, 
2002, at http://www.socialfunds.com/news/article.cgi/article936.html. Section 306(b)(1) of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act amended § 101 of ERISA, adding subsection (i), which requires adminis-
trators to provide participants with notice prior to a lockdown. Section 306(b)(3) of the Sar-
banes-Oxley Act amended § 502(c) of ERISA by adding paragraph (7) creating civil penalties 
for plan administrators who fail to comply with the notice requirement. See U.S. Dep’t of Labor 
Pension and Welfare Benefits Admin., 67 Fed. Reg. 64774, Civil Penalties Under ERISA Section 
502(c)(7) and Conforming Technical Changes on Civil Penalties Under ERISA Sections 
502(c)(2), 502(c)(5), and 502(c)(6) (Oct. 21, 2002). 
 93. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, News Release: Labor Department Issues Rules on Disclosure of 
Pension Plan ‘Blackout Periods,’ Oct. 18, 2002, at 
http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/ebsa/EBSA2002605.htm [hereinafter U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 
Blackout News Release]. 
 94. See Strope, supra note 91. 
 95. See supra Part III. It is the opinion of the Secretary of Labor that Congress must pass 
additional legislation granting workers the right to diversify their accounts as well as access to 
better information, including professional investment advice. See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Blackout 
News Release, supra note 93. On April 11, 2002, the House of Representatives passed a bill 
allowing workers to diversify their investments in employer stock after three years, requiring 
quarterly benefit statements that emphasize the importance of diversification, and giving work-
ers access to investment advice from professional advisers. See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, News Re-
lease: President Takes Action to Protect Pensions and Retirement Security for All Americans, 
Oct. 18, 2002, at http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/ebsa/EBSA2002605.htm. The bill, H.R. 
3762, also prohibits executives from selling employer stock during lockdowns. See Gov’t Fin. 
Officer’s Assoc., Association Issue Brief: Post-Enron Accounting & Pension Reform Proposals, 
June 2002, at http://www.gfoa.org/flc/briefs/062702/post.enron.06.02.pdf. Unfortunately, the 
Senate has failed to pass this legislation as well. See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Blackout News Re-
lease, supra note 93. 
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The interim rules promulgated by the Department of Labor un-
der the Sarbanes-Oxley Act became effective on January 26, 2003. 
The rules require notice to participants thirty to sixty days prior to the 
commencement of the lockdown period.96 The notice must be “writ-
ten in a manner calculated to be understood by the average plan par-
ticipant,”97 and must describe the rights of the participant that will be 
temporarily suspended during the period as well as the investments 
subject to the suspension.98 Additionally, the notice must include the 
anticipated beginning and ending dates of the lockdown99 and advise 
participants to review their current investments in light of the upcom-
ing suspension of trading.100 Finally, the notice must include the name, 
address, and telephone number of the plan administrator or one who 
can answer questions regarding the lockdown.101 
IV. THE COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS 
In the lockdown allegations of the Complaint, Plaintiffs allege 
that Enron; the Administrative Committee; top executives, such as 
Lay and Skilling; and the Northern Trust Company (“Defendants”) 
were and acted as fiduciaries under ERISA.102 
According to the Complaint, in October 2001 the Defendants 
breached their fiduciary duties to the participants of the 401(k) Plan 
by continuing with the lockdown as planned. Defendants allegedly 
improperly prevented the participants from selling the Enron stock in 
their individual accounts during a time when the value of Enron stock 
plummeted.103 The Complaint alleges that because the Defendants 
knew some or all of the facts concerning Enron’s precarious financial 
 
 96. See 29 C.F.R. § 2520.101-3(b)(2)(i) (2003). 
 97. 29 C.F.R. § 2520.101-3(b)(1) (2003). 
 98. See 29 C.F.R. § 2520.101-3(b)(1)(ii) (2003). 
 99. See 29 C.F.R. § 2520.101-3(b)(1)(iii) (2003). 
 100. See 29 C.F.R. § 2520.101-3(b)(1)(iv) (2003). 
 101. See 29 C.F.R. § 2520.101-3(b)(1)(vi) (2003). Additionally, if the plan administrator does 
not comply with the notice regulations, a second set of rules provides for civil penalties of up to 
100 dollars per day per plan participant. See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Blackout News Release, supra 
note 93. The Secretary of Labor will consider the degree and/or willfulness of the failure or 
refusal to provide notice, computed from the date of the administrator’s failure of the lockdown 
until the final day of the lockdown. See 29 C.F.R. § 2560.502(c)-7(b)(1). 
 102. See First Am. and Consolidated Compl., Tittle v. Enron Corp., No. H-01-3913, at 752 
(S.D. Tex. Apr. 8, 2002). The pertinent ERISA fiduciary language is found in 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1002(21)(A) (2000). This Note will discuss the allegations against the Administrative Commit-
tee only. See supra note 9. 
 103. See First Am. and Consolidated Compl., Tittle v. Enron Corp., No. H-01-3913, at ¶ 753 
(S.D. Tex. Apr. 8, 2002). 
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condition they also knew or should have known that it was imprudent 
to proceed with the lockdown. Furthermore, the Complaint asserts 
that the Defendants had a duty to postpone the lockdown, as a loyal 
and prudent fiduciary would have done in light of this information. 
As a result of these breaches of duty, Plaintiffs assert that, as partici-
pants and beneficiaries of the 401(k) Plan, they lost a great deal of 
money during the lockdown period.104 
Additionally, the Complaint asserts that the Defendants had a 
duty to provide timely and informative notice of the lockdown to par-
ticipants so they could safeguard their rights by directing the fiduciar-
ies to sell the Enron stock allocated to their individual accounts. In 
failing to do so, the Defendants allegedly breached their ERISA du-
ties, causing the participants to lose much of their retirement ac-
counts.105 
Finally, but for these asserted breaches of fiduciary duty, the 
Complaint asserts that the assets of the plan would have been in-
vested in more profitable alternative investments available under the 
Plan,106 and that the Court should restore the losses to the Plan caused 
by the Defendants’ breach of fiduciary duties.107 
V. THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCCESS FOR PARTICIPANTS IN 
LOCKDOWN LITIGATIONS 
The Tittle litigation is illustrative in analyzing the potential for 
success of lockdown claims against fiduciaries in lawsuits by partici-
pants in 401(k) plans. In order for the Tittle Plaintiffs, or other plain-
tiffs similarly situated, to recover with respect to the lockdown claim 
against the Administrative Committee, or an entity similar to the 
Committee,108 the Committee must first qualify as a fiduciary of the 
401(k) plan in terms of the decision to continue with the lockdown. 
Second, if the Administrative Committee, or a similar entity in other 
litigations, indeed qualifies as a fiduciary, it must have breached a 
fiduciary duty under ERISA by making the decision to continue with 
the lockdown. Stating the issue specifically, did the Enron Adminis-
 
 104. See id. at ¶ 758. 
 105. See id. at ¶ 759. While this allegation is related to the lockdown, it does not deal with 
the issue of Defendant’s decision to continue with the lockdown as planned, and will therefore 
not be discussed in this Note. 
 106. See id. at ¶ 761. 
 107. See id. at ¶ 763. 
 108. See supra note 9. 
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trative Committee, as a fiduciary of the 401(k) Plan, breach the duties 
of prudence and loyalty by not postponing the lockdown despite their 
awareness of the poor financial health of the Corporation?109 
A. Was the Administrative Committee a Fiduciary of the Plan with 
Regard to the Lockdown? 
As discussed above, under ERISA a fiduciary is anyone who ex-
ercises discretionary control or authority over plan management or 
plan assets, has discretionary authority or responsibility for the ad-
ministration of a 401(k) plan, or provides investment advice to a 
401(k) plan for compensation or has the authority or responsibility to 
do so.110 Plan trustees, plan administrators, and members of a plan’s 
investment committee may be fiduciaries.111 
“Despite the ability of an ERISA fiduciary to wear two hats,” a 
fiduciary must “wear the fiduciary hat when making fiduciary deci-
sions.”112 The language of ERISA “plainly indicates that the fiduciary 
function is not an indivisible one. In other words, a court must ask 
whether a person [or entity] is a fiduciary with respect to the particu-
lar activity at issue.”113 
The named fiduciary of the 401(k) Plan is the Enron Corporation 
Savings Plan Administrative Committee, the administrator of the 
plan.114 In the 401(k) Plan document, Enron placed a fiduciary duty 
on the Administrative Committee to discharge its duties and respon-
sibilities with respect to the plan solely in the interest of the partici-
 
 109. In the final step, which this Note will not address, the remedies that are available and 
adequate for a given breach must be considered. Under ERISA, only equitable or remedial 
relief is available for a breach of fiduciary duty. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2000); see also 
Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 508, 515 (1996). 
 110. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, PENSION AND WELFARE BENEFITS ADMIN., What You 
Should Know . . . About Your Pension Rights, Jan. 2002, at 45, available at 
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/publications/wyskapr.html. 
 111. See id. 
 112. Bussian v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 223 F.3d 286, 295 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Pegram v. Her-
drich, 530 U.S. 211, 225 (2000)). 
 113. Coleman v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 969 F.2d 54, 61 (4th Cir. 1992) (“[T]he inclusion 
of the phrase ‘to the extent’ in § 1002(21)(A) means that a party is a fiduciary only as to the 
activities which bring the person within the definition.”); see also 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8 (2003). 
 114. See ENRON CORP., ENRON CORP. SAVINGS PLAN, XIII.1 Administration of the Plan: 
Appointment of Committee, as amended and restated July 1, 1999; see also First Am. and Con-
solidated Compl., Tittle v. Enron Corp., No. H-01-3913, at ¶ 44 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 8, 2002). The 
Complaint alleges that the members of the Administrative Committee include, among others: 
Cindy Olson, James Prentice, Mary K. Joyce, Sheila Knudsen, Rod Hayslett, Paula Rieker, Tod 
A. Lindholm, James G. Barnhart, Keith Crane, William J. Gulyassy, and David Shields. See id. 
at ¶¶ 47–60. 
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pants, for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to participants; 
to discharge those duties with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence 
under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in 
a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the con-
duct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims; and to 
diversify the instruments of the plan so as to minimize the risk of 
large losses.115 
Thus, the Administrative Committee was specifically granted fi-
duciary responsibilities.116 It had the “authority to control and manage 
the operation and administration of the plan under section 402 of 
ERISA.”117 “Without question, as the persons and entity charged with 
responsibility for managing the plans and their assets, the members of 
the Administrative Committee were plan fiduciaries.”118 
B. Did the Administrative Committee, as a Fiduciary of the 401(k) 
Plan, Act Loyally and Prudently in the Decision to Continue with the 
Lockdown as Planned? 
As discussed above, fiduciaries owe duties of prudence and loy-
alty to the participants and beneficiaries of a 401(k) plan.119 At a 
minimum, ERISA requires fiduciaries to be objective, thorough, and 
analytical in the decision-making process.120 
The duty of prudence requires that fiduciaries act “with the care, 
skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing 
that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such 
matter would use in the conduct of” a similar enterprise.121 “When we 
apply [the duty of prudence] to the facts of a particular case, we re-
main mindful of ERISA’s underlying purposes: to protect and 
strengthen the rights of employees, to enforce strict fiduciary stan-
dards, and to encourage the development of private retirement 
 
 115. See Hearings, supra note 54, at 239 (statement of Senator Lieberman). 
 116. See id. 
 117. Letter from George Miller, Senior Democratic Member, House Committee on Educa-
tion and the Workforce to Elaine Chao, Secretary of Labor, U.S. Dept. of Labor (Feb. 8, 2002), 
available at http://edworkforce.house.gov/democrats/enronlettertochao.html. 
 118. Amended Brief of the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae Opposing the Motions to 
Dismiss, Tittle v. Enron Corp., No. H-01-3913, at 5 (S.D. Tex. filed Apr. 8, 2002), available at 
http://www.dol.gov/sol/images/EnronBrief1.fnl.PDF. 
 119. See supra notes 83–87 and accompanying text. 
 120. See Bussian v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 223 F.3d 286, 299 (5th Cir. 2000). 
 121. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (2000); see also In re Unisys Sav. Plan Litig., 74 F.3d 420, 
433–34 (3d Cir. 1996). 
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plans.”122 The prudence requirement focuses “on a fiduciary’s conduct 
in arriving at an investment decision, not on its results, and ask[s] 
whether a fiduciary employed the appropriate methods to investigate 
and determine the merits of a particular investment.”123 
The duty of loyalty requires that fiduciaries discharge their duties 
solely in the interests of participants, for the exclusive purpose of 
providing benefits to participants.124 “[F]iduciaries act consistently 
with ERISA’s obligations if their decisions are made with an eye sin-
gle to the interests of the participants and beneficiaries.”125 They must 
“keep the interests of beneficiaries foremost in their minds, taking all 
steps necessary to prevent conflicting interests from entering into the 
decision-making process.”126 
To determine if a breach of these fiduciary duties occurred, one 
must assess what information regarding the financial health of the 
company the fiduciaries knew, or should have known. 
As outlined in Part II, an in-house lawyer reviewing the ques-
tionable transactions in a memo determined that one could conclude 
that Enron’s financial books were being manipulated.127 He informed 
his supervisors of his conclusions and then changed them at their re-
quest.128 A vice president of the company, Sherron Watkins, wrote a 
whistle-blowing memo directly to Kenneth Lay that included predic-
tions of an accounting scandal.129 Others in the Corporation, including 
members of the Administrative Committee, were also aware of the 
allegations in Watkins’ memo.130 Additionally, the SEC had begun an 
investigation into the financial practices of the Corporation. Thus, it is 
clear that information regarding the debatable financial health was 
available to both the Corporation itself as well as the Administrative 
 
 122. In re Unisys Sav. Plan Litig., 74 F.3d at 434.  
 123. Id. The duty of prudence requires that “at the time they engaged in the challenged 
transactions, [the fiduciaries] employed the appropriate methods to investigate the merits” of 
the decision. Bussian, 223 F3d. at 299 (citations omitted). It requires “prudence, not pre-
science.” Id. 
 124. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A)(i) (2000); see also Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 506 
(1996). The duty of loyalty, or the obligation of a fiduciary to administer the plan solely in the 
interests of participants, is the most fundamental duty imposed by ERISA. See Bussian, 223 
F.3d at 294 (citing Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 224 (2000)); see also Simone & Butash, 
supra note 81, at *685. 
 125. Bussian, 223 F.3d at 298 (citations and quotations omitted). 
 126. Id. at 298 (citations omitted). 
 127. See supra text accompanying note 49. 
 128. See supra text accompanying note 50. 
 129. See supra text accompanying notes 51–53. 
 130. See supra text accompanying notes 55–56. 
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Committee. As Senator Durbin asked of Mikie Rath during the Sen-
ate Governmental Affairs Committee: 
But there is something that just does not compute . . . you had to 
understand that the lockdown period meant that [the participant 
employees] stood the risk of the value of their 401(k) plummeting 
during that period of time . . . How could you think [that] you were 
doing the employees a favor by locking them out of a market when 
your stock is plummeting . . .?131 
To Ms. Rath’s reply that the Administrative Committee could 
not predict the value of the stock, Senator Durbin replied, 
Do you see this chart over here? Is this a trend line? It looks like 
one to me. I’m sure you were hoping that things would get better. 
But I’m a liberal arts lawyer, so I don’t know much about this. But I 
look at that and say, ‘Does not look like a good investment.’ You 
must have been aware of the same thing.132 
Indeed, the Administrative Committee, the entity charged with 
protecting the participants’ interests,133 considered the possibilities of 
postponing the lockdown, or halting it altogether.134 
Furthermore, evidence exists throughout the minutes of the Ad-
ministrative Committee’s meetings that members considered the vi-
ability of various investments in Enron’s retirement plans. 
Alternatives available under the 401(k) Plan other than Enron stock 
were considered and replaced with different investment options.135 
During the meeting on December 9, 1999, Mr. Newgard proposed 
new guidelines that included performance standards and criteria for 
investments to guide the Committee in monitoring and replacing the 
investments of the retirement plans.136 On February 8, 2001, the 
Committee discussed the general decline of U.S. stocks, as the 
 
 131. Hearings, supra note 54, at 251 (statement of Senator Durbin). 
 132. See id. 
 133. See supra text accompanying notes 114–18. 
 134. See supra text accompanying notes 66–68. 
 135. On October 26, 1999 Jim Newgard summarized the returns from the first three quarters 
of the year, and an asset allocation study was recommended. Mr. Newgard recommended that 
the Delaware Fund be replaced with a Vanguard fund, and the board voted to make the change. 
See Cynthia Barrow, Minutes of the Meeting of the Enron Corp. Administrative Committee 
(Oct. 26, 1999), available at http://edworkforce.house.gov/democrats/enroninfo.html. On De-
cember 9, 1999 the Committee passed a motion to replace an under performing Provident fund 
with a small cap growth index fund. See Cynthia Barrow, Minutes of the Meeting of the Enron 
Corp. Administrative Committee (Dec. 9, 1999), available at 
http://edworkforce.house.gov/democrats/enroninfo.html. 
 136. See Cynthia Barrow, Minutes of the Meeting of the Enron Corp. Administrative Com-
mittee (Dec. 9, 1999), available at http://edworkforce.house.gov/democrats/enroninfo.html. 
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NASDAQ had its worst year in its thirty-year history,137 and it was 
agreed that performance would be reviewed monthly.138 The Commit-
tee was therefore aware of the market’s decline, and of its effect on 
the 401(k) Plan. However, no review of Enron stock is evident until 
November 1, 2001,139 after the lockdown had already been imple-
mented. The Committee, after the lockdown had begun, passed Cindy 
Olson’s motion “to hire a reputable firm to advise the Committee on 
Enron stock.”140 The decision to move forward with the lockdown, or 
the transfer between Northern Trust to Hewitt Associates, was out-
lined, and the Committee agreed that it had been prudent to move 
forward.141 On December 5, 2001, after the lockdown had been lifted, 
the Committee determined “that it would be prudent, at [that] time, 
to have the Enron Stock Fund professionally and externally evaluated 
by an independent group.”142 
Thus, evidence that adequate information regarding the financial 
health of the Corporation (and thus the value of Enron stock) existed 
within the Corporation itself and which the Administrative Commit-
tee was aware of. Therefore, it is likely that the fiduciaries of the 
401(k) Plan were aware of the precarious position that Enron main-
tained, and if they were not, they should have been. Additionally, 
while the Committee actively evaluated some of the alternatives in 
the 401(k) Plan, they did not discuss the value of Enron stock (which 
comprised more than 60% of the plan) until after the lockdown had 
already begun. If it was prudent to examine the Enron Stock Fund 
after the lockdown on December 5, 2001, it would also have been 
 
 137. See Cynthia Barrow, Minutes of the Meeting of the Enron Corp. Administrative Com-
mittee (Feb. 8, 2001), available at http://edworkforce.house.gov/democrats/enroninfo.html. 
 138. See id. 
 139. See Cynthia Barrow, Minutes of the Meeting of the Enron Corp. Administrative Com-
mittee (Nov. 1, 2001), available at http://edworkforce.house.gov/democrats/enroninfo.html. 
Mikie Rath advised the Committee that it had “no duty to put out cautionary advice on the 
value/risk of holding Enron stock since the Committee does not act in the capacity of an invest-
ment advisor.” Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. The members present at this meeting were Paula H. Rieker, Sheila Knudsen, James 
S. Prentice, and Cindy Olson. Additionally, Cynthia Barrow, Mikie Rath, Sharon Butcher, and 
Pat Mackin were present, as well as representatives of Hewitt Associates. See id. 
 142. See Chris Rahaim, Minutes of the Meeting of the Enron Corp. Administrative Commit-
tee (Dec. 5, 2001), available at http://edworkforce.house.gov/democrats/enroninfo.html. Addi-
tionally, on October 26, 1999, a special meeting was set up to review the fiduciary duties to 
Enron’s retirement plans. See Barrow, Minutes of the Meeting of the Enron Corp. Administra-
tive Committee (Oct. 26, 1999), supra note 135. This meeting, where a review of member duties 
and responsibilities took place, occurred on March 9, 2000. See Cynthia Barrow, Minutes of the 
Meeting of the Enron Corp. Administrative Committee Meeting (March 9, 2000), available at 
http://edworkforce.house.gov/democrats/enroninfo.html. 
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prudent for the Administrative Committee to examine the fund prior 
to the lockdown. 
The Administrative Committee had several options in light of 
this information regarding the Corporation’s declining financial 
health.143 First, they could do nothing and continue with the lockdown 
as planned, which was the chosen path. As shown by the Enron situa-
tion, the refusal to postpone a lockdown holds a great probability that 
a breach of fiduciary duty will occur. Second, the Administrative 
Committee could have postponed the lockdown period.144 While this 
option is less likely to result in a breach of fiduciary duty, it raises 
several issues. 
1. The Duty of Impartiality 
First, in dealing with participants, fiduciaries such as the Admin-
istrative Committee must act impartially.145 The Committee, in de-
fense of its decision to continue with the lockdown as planned, asserts 
that current employee participants were likely to receive the informa-
tion regarding the postponement before retiree participants. This 
violates the duty of impartiality because current employees would be 
able to reallocate their assets while retirees would not.146 
However, while the common law of trusts “requires a trustee to 
take impartial account of the interests of all beneficiaries,”147 a trustee 
also has broad powers to do all acts necessary or desirable to carry 
out the purposes of the trust.148 One such purpose of the Enron 401(k) 
 
 143. These options stem from the fact that there were no compelling circumstances mandat-
ing that the lockdown occur specifically during the planned timeframe. 
 144. Fiduciaries may violate the duties of prudence and loyalty not only by poorly schedul-
ing a lockdown period, but also by not changing the timing of a well-planned lockdown when 
information becomes available that the value of the plan assets may fluctuate throughout the 
planned timeframe. 
 145. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, §§ 183, 232 (1959); see also Varity Corp. v. 
Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 514 (1996); Williams v. WCI Steel Co., 37 Fed. Appx. 723, 729 (No. 00-
4363) (6th Cir. 2002) (“When there are two or more beneficiaries of a trust, the trustee is under 
a duty to deal impartially with them.”) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, §§ 183 
(1959)). 
 146. Current employees, but not retirees, would be attending an upcoming all-employee 
meeting during which the information could be provided to them. See Hearings, supra note 54, 
at 246 (statement of Mikie Rath). 
 147. Varity Corp., 516 U.S. at 514–15. 
 148. See Bracken v. Block, 561 N.E.2d 1273, 1274–75 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990). The fiduciary’s 
“‘duty of impartiality . . . ordinarily’ gives him ‘considerable discretion’ in deciding the ‘balance’ 
between successive beneficiaries.” Mahoney v. Bd. of Trs., 973 F.2d 968, 971 (1st Cir. 1992) 
(quoting 3A Scott on Trusts § 232 (2001)). 
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Plan was to provide benefits to participants.149 It seems that a simple 
balancing of providing the opportunity to participants to reallocate 
their assets during the financial decline and the chance that retirees 
might not receive equal notice of the postponement weighs in favor of 
postponing the lockdown. Because this has the greatest potential to 
enable the participants to receive later retirement benefits by moving 
their investments from the declining Enron stock, this aligns with the 
purpose to provide benefits to participants. 
Additionally, throughout the period when the lockdown was in 
place, many participants, including retirees, attempted to reallocate 
their assets despite awareness of the lockdown.150 Therefore, even if 
the Administrative Committee postponed the lockdown, and current 
employee participants were the only class who received it, it is likely 
that retiree participants would have had the opportunity to reallocate 
regardless because the decline in the stock would have prompted 
them to do so. 
2. Insider Trading 
If a fiduciary announces the postponement of a planned lock-
down, it is likely that participants will inquire as to the reasons sup-
porting that decision. In the Enron lockdown situation, the 
information on which the Committee would have based that decision 
was nonpublic information. Therefore, communicating that informa-
tion to employees raises insider trading concerns. 
Insider trading liability, or the liability of one who trades securi-
ties on the basis of material, nonpublic information (“insider” infor-
mation) is imposed by Rule 10b-5,151 promulgated under the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.152 The classical theory of insider 
trading provides that Rule 10b-5 is violated when one buys or sells 
securities on the basis of material, nonpublic information if: (1) he 
owes a duty to the other party in the transaction; and (2) he is an in-
sider of the corporation in whose shares he trades, thus owing a fidu-
ciary duty to the corporation’s shareholders.153 A person also may be 
 
 149. See ENRON CORP., ENRON CORP. SAVINGS PLAN, XV.3 Fiduciary Provisions: Fiduci-
ary Duty, as amended and restated July 1, 1999. 
 150. See supra text accompanying note 65. 
 151. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2003). 
 152. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000). 
 153. See George F. Gabel, Jr., Who May Be Liable Under “Misappropriation Theory” of 
Imposing Duty to Disclose or Abstain From Trading Under § 10(b) of Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 (15 U.S.C.A. § 78j(b)) and SEC Rule 10(b)-5 (17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5), 114 A.L.R. FED. 323, 
EBERLEIN FINAL 4/20/04  9:12 AM 
720 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 79:699 
 
liable if: (1) he is a tippee who received the material, nonpublic in-
formation from an insider of the corporation; and (2) he knows, or 
should know, that the insider breached a fiduciary duty in disclosing 
the information to him.154 These insiders have a duty to abstain from 
trading securities based on the material, nonpublic information until 
that information has been disclosed to the public.155 
The Administrative Committee contends that giving participants 
the explanation for the lockdown postponement that they would in-
evitably request would place both the Administrative Committee and 
the participants in a position to be liable for insider trading because 
participants would then sell their Enron stock based on material, 
nonpublic information. 
However, for the Administrative Committee and the participants 
to be liable for insider trading,156 the Committee must personally 
benefit from the disclosure of the reasons regarding the lockdown 
postponement, and must breach a fiduciary duty to the shareholders 
by disclosing this information.157 Furthermore, the participants must 
know (or should know) that this disclosure was a breach, and actually 
sell their Enron stock based on the information.158 The Administrative 
Committee would receive no personal benefit from disclosing the 
information regarding the reasons behind the lockdown postpone-
ment, and, therefore, there would be no liability on the part of the 
Committee or the participants for insider trading.159 
If the Enron 401(k) Plan participants asked for an explanation 
regarding the postponement of the lockdown, the Administrative 
 
§ 2[a] (1993). This classical theory of insider trading is defined by the Supreme Court in 
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). 
 154. See Gabel, supra note 153. 
 155. See Dirks v. S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646, 659–63 (1983); see also F. S. Tinio, Who is an “In-
sider” Within § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.A. § 78(j)(b))–and SEC 
Rule 10b-5 Promulgated Thereunder—Making Unlawful Corporate Insider’s Nondisclosure of 
Information to Seller or Purchaser of Corporation’s Stock, 2 A.L.R. FED. 274, § 2 (1969). While 
directors, officers, and controlling officers are traditionally recognized as insiders, employees 
that own securities and have access to nonpublic, material information, including those who 
acquire stock through 401(k) plans, are subject to the obligations of an insider. See Dirks, 463 
U.S. at 659–63. This extension comports not only with the public policy of Rule 10b-5 to place 
investors on an equal footing with insiders, as well as that employees may also be viewed as 
agents of the stockholders and thus have a duty not to use inside information for personal bene-
fit. See Tinio, supra. 
 156. Or more accurately, for the participants to be subject to the duty to disclose or abstain 
from trading based on the nonpublic, material information. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 659–63. 
 157. See id. 
 158. See id. 
 159. See id. 
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Committee would be liable if they lied or misrepresented their rea-
sons, if those reasons were material.160 Materiality “depends on the 
significance the reasonable investor would place on the . . . misrepre-
sented information.”161 Because the participants in the 401(k) Plan 
would clearly place great significance on information that Enron was 
in such a precarious state, the reasons behind a postponement deci-
sion would be material. Therefore, the Administrative Committee 
could not lie or misrepresent their reasons for a postponement. 
The Administrative Committee could have avoided lying or mis-
representing its material reasons by issuing a “no comment” state-
ment, which is not considered misleading and would not result in 
liability.162 Therefore, simply by stating “no comment,” the Adminis-
trative Committee could have avoided liability and given the partici-
pants the opportunity to change the allocation of their 401(k) plans 
from the declining Enron stock to a more stable alternative. 
In the alternative, the Committee could have announced any ex-
planation they wished to offer the participants of the plan to the pub-
lic as well to avoid any insider trading liability on behalf of the 
Administrative Committee or the participants. Insider trading liability 
does not result from trading based on public information. 
3. Reliance on Counsel 
In a lockdown situation, a fiduciary may assert reliance on coun-
sel as a defense.163 In the Enron situation, the Administrative Com-
mittee claims that because it relied on the advice of counsel in the 
decision to continue with the lockdown as planned, it cannot be liable 
for any breach. “Fiduciaries . . . are entitled to rely on the advice they 
 
 160. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2003). The SEC promulgated Rule 10-b5 pursuant to its 
authority under 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2000). See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230 (1988) 
(holding that public statements denying merger negotiations which were taking place were 
misleading as to material facts and in violation of Rule 10b-5). Rule 10b-5 provides:  
It shall be unlawful for any person . . . [t]o make any untrue statement of a material 
fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, 
in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading . . . in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 
See id. at 230 n.6. 
 161. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 240. The inquiry for materiality is fact-specific. See id. 
 162. See In re Carnation Co., Exchange Act Release No. 22214, 33 S.E.C. Docket 1025 
(1985); Basic, 485 U.S. at 239 n.17 (“‘No comment’ statements are generally the functional 
equivalent of silence,” and absent a duty to disclose, under Rule 10b-5 silence is not mislead-
ing.). 
 163. See Donovan v. Cunningham, 716 F.2d 1455, 1474 (5th Cir. 1983) (“ERISA fiduciar-
ies . . . are entitled to rely on the expertise of others.”). 
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obtain from independent experts.”164 The use of counsel “may serve 
the dual purposes of increasing the thoroughness and impartiality of 
the relevant investigation, and of relieving the fiduciary of any taint of 
a potential conflict.”165 
However, fiduciaries may not blindly rely on the advice of coun-
sel.166 “An independent appraisal is not a magic wand that fiduciaries 
may simply waive over a transaction to ensure that their responsibili-
ties are fulfilled. It is a tool, and like other tools, is useful only if used 
properly.”167 Therefore, mere reliance on the advice of counsel is not 
a complete defense.168 
For reliance by a fiduciary on an expert’s opinion to be justifi-
able, the fiduciary must consider the reputation and experience of the 
expert, the extensiveness and thoroughness of the investigation by the 
expert, whether the opinion of the expert is supported by relevant 
material, and whether assumptions of the expert are appropriate to 
the decision.169 “[T]he fiduciary is required to make an honest, objec-
tive effort to read the valuation, understand it, and question the 
methods and assumptions that do not make sense.”170 
Thus, while the Administrative Committee was entitled to re-
quest the advice of counsel regarding the possibility of postponing the 
lockdown, they were not entitled to rely blindly on the opinion ren-
dered by counsel. Although it was possible that not all employee and 
retired participants would receive notice of the postponement of the 
lockdown at the same time, it is likely that many participants, includ-
ing retirees, would have tried to trade during the planned timeframe 
and, therefore, would have become aware of the postponement. In 
fact, many participants did attempt to trade throughout the lockdown 
period, but were unable to do so.171 Additionally, there is no evidence 
in the minutes of the Administrative Committee meetings that the 
Committee considered the many factors that justify reliance on coun-
sel’s opinion, especially whether the lockdown was appropriate in 
 
 164. Bussian v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 223 F.3d 286, 300 (5th Cir. 2000). 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 301. 
 167. Cunningham, 716 F.2d at 1474. 
 168. See Bussian, 223 F.3d at 301 (citing Donovan v. Mazzola, 716 F.2d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 
1983)). 
 169. See id. 
 170. Id. (quoting Howard v. Shay, 100 F.3d 1484, 1490 (9th Cir. 1996)). 
 171. See supra text accompanying note 65. 
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light of Enron’s situation.172 Considering the information available 
regarding the financial state of the Corporation, it seems it was both 
disloyal and imprudent to continue with the lockdown as planned 
because it was not in the best interests of participants, nor would that 
decision have the greatest likelihood of providing benefits to the par-
ticipants. 
The issues of impartiality, insider trading, and reliance on coun-
sel are not likely to provide a defense for the Administrative Commit-
tee or fiduciaries in lockdown claims generally.173 The decision not to 
postpone the lockdown was not made with the requisite skill, care, 
prudence, and diligence required of fiduciaries, and was not solely in 
the interest of participants for the exclusive purpose of providing 
benefits. Therefore, it is likely that the court will find that the Admin-
istrative Committee breached the duties of prudence and loyalty im-
posed by ERISA by continuing with the lockdown as planned, despite 
knowledge of Enron’s precarious financial state and the declining 
value of its stock.174 These fiduciary duties are among the “highest 
known to the law,”175 and such a demanding standard clearly was not 
satisfied by the Administrative Committee’s decision not to postpone 
the lockdown. 
 
 172. See generally ENRON CORP. ADMIN. COMM., Administrative Committee Minutes, 
available at http://edworkforce.house.gov/democrats/enroninfo.html. 
 173. An additional defense of the Administrative Committee rests in 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1104(c)(1)(B) (2000). Under this Section, no fiduciary shall be liable for any loss, or by reason 
of any breach, which results from a participant or beneficiary’s exercise of control. See 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1104(c)(1)(B) (2000). This qualification has important ramifications for the participants such 
as the Tittle plaintiffs, who exert control over their 401(k) plans, because they individually 
choose how to allocate their money across the funds the employer provides. Therefore, the 
Administrative Committee raised in its defense that because the Enron participants exercise 
such control, they cannot be liable for the decline of the 401(k) plan because the employees 
individually directed their investments into Enron stock. 
  However, because of the inherent nature of a lockdown in removing the participants’ 
control over their accounts, this defense is unavailable to the Administrative Committee. Once 
the employer initiates the lockdown period, participants can make absolutely no changes in the 
allocation of their retirement money until the employer terminates the lockdown. Because it is 
the employer who institutes lockdowns, and it is the employer who terminates the lockdown 
period, it is the employer, not the participants, who is exerting control over the allocation of the 
participants’ 401(k) accounts. Therefore, if a fiduciary breaches an ERISA duty in instituting a 
lockdown, they are responsible for the losses that result from the lockdown, even though nor-
mally the participants exercise individual control over their accounts. 
 174. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (2000). 
 175. Bussian, 223 F.3d at 294; see also Sommers Drug Stores Co. Employee Profit Sharing 
Trust v. Corrigan Enters., Inc., 793 F.2d 1456, 1468 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1089 
(1987). 
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CONCLUSION 
Unfortunately, in suits by individuals seeking relief for breach of 
fiduciary duties under ERISA, equitable relief is the sole remedy 
available.176 Therefore, although it is likely that a Court will find that 
fiduciaries like the Administrative Committee breached their duties 
of prudence and loyalty in lockdown situations similar to Enron, no 
compensatory damages are available. Clearly, further changes in 
ERISA are needed, such as a clear delineation of the fiduciary duties 
that exist during a lockdown. Hopefully, public discussion of the dis-
astrous effects of Enron for the participants in the 401(k) Plan will 
bring both greater protections and a more effective remedy in order 
to prevent such catastrophes in the future. 
 
 176. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2000); Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 508, 515 (1996). 
